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Since the last Polish parliamentary elections in 2015, some deep changes have been announced 
in the legal framework of state-owned companies. The changes are supposed to be mainly 
targeted at setting different rules of remuneration policy of the boards’ members compared 
to private-owned companies. They are meant to conquer recognised abuses in management 
and supervision areas of state-owned companies, which have not been overcome by recent, 
quite liberal legal regulations, nor by self-limitation and self-control. In addition corporate 
governance in Polish state-owned enterprises is facing massive changes. At the beginning of 
2016, former Minister of Treasury Dawid Jackiewicz announced liquidation of the Ministry of 
Treasury in January 2017, and the revision of State’s supervision over the SOE. After liquidation 
of the Ministry of Treasury, ownership rights over SOEs will be exercised by sector ministries. 
The aim of the paper is to analyse the implementation of Chapter II of the OECD Guidelines on 
Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises’ provisions into Polish legal order governing 
state-owned enterprises.
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1. introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyse the implementation of chapter ii of the oecd Guidelines 
on corporate Governance of state-owned enterprises’ (hereinafter: the oecd Guidelines) 
provisions into polish legal order governing state-owned enterprises (hereinafter: the soe).
More than 25 years ago in poland a wide and rapid transformation of state enterprises 
into commercial companies began, making them operate according to roughly the same 
economic and legal rules as private-owned companies. Their insufficient supervision by 
the major shareholder (the state or other public authority) as well as common lack of wise 
management and self-limitation of people responsible for running state-owned companies 
combined with repeating nominations to the boards of persons with a decent political 
background instead of solid experience in business led to widely acknowledged abuses in 
managing state-owned companies in poland over that time. They were especially seen as a 
privilege of interests for certain individuals and tied to political and business connections 
over unquestioned goals for the companies and their major shareholder. since the great 
political and economic transformation in poland in the late ’80s, state-owned companies 
were recognised as “spoils of war” by the winners of parliamentary elections, which was 
a common sin of all political parties governing poland over that time. after the elections, 
state-owned companies were subject to deep personal changes, which most of the times 
were not entirely motivated by merits.
several months ago, as a result of the recent elections in poland that took place in the fall 
of 2015, some deep changes have been announced in the legal framework of state-owned 
companies. it is worth mentioning that no significant changes have been made over the last 
15 years, although the legal framework was far from perfect. The changes are supposed to 
be mainly targeted at setting different rules of remuneration policy for the boards’ members 
compared to private-owned companies. They are meant to conquer recognised abuses 
in management and supervision areas of state-owned companies, which had not been 
overcome by recent, quite liberal legal regulations, nor by self-limitation and self-control. 
also corporate governance in polish state-owned enterprises is facing massive changes. 
at the beginning of 2016, former Minister of treasury dawid Jackiewicz announced the 
liquidation of the Ministry of treasury in January 2017, and revision of state’s supervision 
over the soe. on 4 october 2016, the prime Minister announced that ownership rights over 
soes would be exercised by sector ministries.
2. the soes’ leGal ForMs (point a oF the oecd Guidelines)
in poland state-owned enterprises most commonly operate in the forms of capital companies, 
either a limited liability company or a joint-stock company. a marginal role is played by state 
enterprises which are entirely owned by the treasury and operate by virtue of the state 
enterprises act on 25 september 1981. currently, there are only two state enterprises which 
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are supervised by the Ministry of treasury.1 state enterprises are separate legal persons from 
the treasury, but do not constitute capital companies within the meaning of the commercial 
companies code of 15 september, 2000.
The majority of state-owned enterprises operate in the form of capital companies, to 
which provisions of the commercial companies code of 15 september, 2000, are generally 
applicable. Thus, in external relations state-owned companies are generally subject to the 
same legal framework as private companies. nonetheless, there exist specific provisions of 
competition law and law on public aid which apply to stated-owned companies. 
Further differences between state-owned and private companies consist of the way state-
owned companies’ internal relations are conducted. however, such differences are allowed 
under the oecd Guidelines.
when discussing the internal relations in the soes, consideration must be given to the 
regulations and ordinances of the Minister of treasury or prime Minister, which supplement 
generally applicable legal acts but lack sanctions for non-compliance. as a result, in poland, 
there is no binding corporate governance code designated to state-owned companies. 
however, there exist The principles of corporate supervision over companies with state 
treasury shareholding (second edition) introduced by the Ministry of treasury in 2005, but 
these should be regarded as a soft-law act with a rather limited practical impact.
The principles contain recommendations regarding corporate governance, e.g.
– aims of corporate supervision;
– functioning of supervisory boards;
– functioning of management boards;
– monitoring entities within treasury shareholding;
– cooperation of supervisory board and shareholder’s proxy with a certified auditor, moni-
toring company audit;
– cooperation of supervisory units with supervisory boards or shareholder’s proxies;
– supervision over subsidiaries.
The principles were introduced in accordance with regulation no. 41 of the Minister 
of treasury. while drafting The principles the Ministry of treasury collected comments, 
observations and suggestions from bodies managing and supervising commercial entities 
within state treasury shareholding in order to further improve, streamline and increase the 
effectiveness of corporate supervision.
The principles shall be considered as a soft law, since the Minister of treasury is not 
empowered to issue generally applicable legal acts which regulate corporate governance in 
state-owned companies. accordingly, the principles do not provide for any specific rules 
on corporate governance, but rather gather existing principles into one document and 
express expectations of the state authority. Those expectations are treated as a guideline for 
government bodies or public entities in the process of developing their own solutions. 
1  i.e. Biuro Urządzania Lasu i Geodezji Leśnej and Kopalnie i Zakłady Przetwórcze Siarki “SIARKOPOL” w 
Tarnobrzegu.
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There is a good practice, that being a copy of The principles is sent to every newly 
appointed member of state-owned companies’ supervisory board together with the notice 
of appointment. however, no comply or explain rule applies consequently and the principles 
are rarely observed. 
in its report of 2009, the supreme audit office noted that establishment of internal 
regulations (including the principles) enabled corporate supervision over state-owned 
companies. however, the regulations were not observed in practice (even by the Ministry of 
treasury itself) or were improperly implemented. Furthermore, the supreme audit office 
pointed out a number of irregularities, e.g. lack of analyses of companies’ financial and 
economic standing. 
in practice, major importance for the functioning of supervisory boards have schedules 
in the principles, particularly schedule 1 in the principles, i.e. recommendations for the 
treasury’s sole-shareholder companies and treasury’s majority-shareholder companies 
preparing annual financial statements of the company. The financial statements which are 
to be presented during the general meeting are based on recommendations. introduction 
of precise rules of reporting, especially the standard forms for financial statements, is an 
element of corporate governance in state-owned companies.
it is worth noting that state-owned companies listed on the warsaw stock exchange are 
subject to the Best practice of warsaw stock exchange listed companies. in such event 
state-owned companies are obliged to observe the comply or explain rule. nonetheless, the 
Best practice of the Gpw listed companies is generally applicable to all companies listed, 
regardless of whether the companies are state-owned or not.
3. the soes’ ManaGeMent and independence (points B and c 
oF the oecd Guidelines) 
subsequent governments continue to intervene in the soe’s management and redefine soe 
objectives in a non-transparent manner. 
The difference between interest of the SOE and interest of the State – its major shareholder – 
is still not observed. This is exemplified by a practice of increasing soes share capital from 
reserve capital in order to advance budget revenues due to the cit.
however, widening control over capital companies by majority shareholders is a regular 
practice, it seems to be a particularly sensitive issue in the soes. 
currently, the burning issue is political impact on hiring decisions in soe, which is subject 
to wide criticism since the boards’ members are removed regularly after parliamentary 
elections.2 The soes’ bodies which are most commonly put in jeopardy are supervisory 
2 postuła, igor (2013): Nadzór korporacyjny w spółkach Skarbu Państwa. warszawa, wolters kluwer polska 
s.a. source: https://sip.lex.pl/#/monografia/369268038/3 (9 october 2016); wiatrowski, piotr (2014): 
Niekonstytucyjna regulacja tzw. konkursów do rad nadzorczych spółek Skarbu Państwa. in kidyba, andrzej 
ed.: Skarb Państwa a działalność gospodarcza. warszawa, wolters kluwer s.a. source: https://sip.lex.pl/#/
monografia/369301832/66 (9 october 2016) 
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boards, as in state-owned companies’ management board members are usually appointed and 
removed from the office by the supervisory board.3 it should also be noted, that supervisory 
boards not only appoint management boards’ members, but also run the qualification 
procedure for management boards. Thus, from a political perspective supervisory boards 
are the first port of call. 
The commercialization and privatization act is silent as regards qualification requirements 
of members of management boards’. nevertheless, according to sec. iii (1) (2) of the principles 
of corporate supervision over companies with state treasury shareholding, boards 
members are expected to: possess appropriate educational background and experience, 
combined with resourcefulness and drive to continually improve the economic and 
financial standing of the company as well as aim at increasing its value and competitiveness. 
They should also have the ability to cooperate with the rest of the company employees. 
such wording is open to a wide range of interpretations.
as regards supervisory boards, the selection process is conducted through a public 
qualification procedure, in accordance with ordinance no. 45 of the Minister of treasury of 6 
december, 2007, on the principles and procedures for selecting candidates for the composition 
of supervisory boards in state-owned commercial companies and for supervisory boards of 
other legal entities supervised by the Minister of treasury. supervisory board members are 
appointed and removed from the office by the general meeting. however, in former state 
enterprises (which existed prior to 1989, now operating as commercial companies) two-
fifths of the members are elected by employees and  the election made by employees binds 
the general meeting (art. 14 of the commercialization and privatisation act). 
Furthermore, members of supervisory boards must be qualified to sit on supervisory 
boards, which includes passing the exam for candidates for supervisory board members 
(art. 12 par. 2 of the commercialisation and privatisation act) or having a license exempting 
them from the obligation to pass this exam, i.e. having a phd degree in economics or in law 
or being listed as a legal advisor, attorney, certified auditor and/or investment advisor.
in practice, the applicable legal framework is insufficient to prevent or minimalize the 
political impact on soe’s hiring policy. scholars point to a number of practices which allow 
politics to intervene in soe’s management. 
Firstly, qualification procedure to supervisory boards is conducted only if it is recommended 
by the director of a particular department of the Ministry of treasury and accepted by the 
Minister of treasury. if the election is to be organised without a qualification procedure, 
then the Ministry is not obliged to announce the election to the public (§ 3 of the ordinance 
no. 45 of the Minister of treasury of 6 december 2007). such regulation renders the election 
procedure non-transparent and allows for nominations and appointments to soe’s boards 
based not on candidate’s competences and experience but rather on political support. 
3 The rule does not apply to board members elected by employees under art. 19a of the commercialization and 
privatization act.
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according to press information,4 since the last parliamentary elections around 200 new 
board members were appointed. according to the supreme audit office report, between 
2004–2008, 65% of supervisory boards’ members were removed without any justification. 
recently, it turned out that Bartłomiej Misiewicz, a public relations officer in the Ministry 
of national defence and a polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa s.a. (the armaments industry) 
supervisory board member, did not pass the exam for candidates for supervisory board 
members and has no higher education. referring to the Misiewicz case, the Minister of nati-
onal defence antoni Macierewicz stated that: “inthe  armaments industry there is no need 
for such  a requirement [of higher education and passed exam] but there is a requirement 
for loyalty, cooperation, competence and decisiveness. all of these features are possessed 
by Mr. Misiewicz”.5 The case of Misiewicz is not an exception. in 2005, the supreme audit 
office6 pointed out that 46% of supervisory board members did not pass the required exams 
although they were bound to do so. in this case it is explicit that when it comes to political 
interest the law is not observed at all. Furthermore, it shall be highlighted that there are no 
strict legal consequences of appointing a person who does not meet the formal requirements. 
especially, nobody has ever been sued or criminally accused of breach of law here.
secondly, appointment of the Ministry of treasury officials as board members is regarded 
to be a bonus for an official, paid not by the treasury but by the soe.7 previously, candidates 
to supervisory boards employed by the Ministry of treasury or by other ministries were 
appointed without a qualification procedure. although the law concerning this issue has 
been amended, officials are still appointed outside of the public qualification process, as 
the qualification process is not obligatory. Furthermore, the Ministry of treasury provided 
neither code of ethics for state officials serving as supervisory board members, nor conflict 
of interest rules. The problem was raised by the supreme audit office in 2009, which stated: 
“it should be highlighted that participation of state officials in supervisory boards may lead 
to conflicts of interest. The reason for that is that one person merges work in the entity’s 
supervisory board with supervision over the entity in the ministry”.8 
4 cieśla, wojciech – krzymowski, Michał (2016): Dwustu ludzi dobrej zmiany. source: www.newsweek.pl/
polska/lista-nominacji-pis-w-spolkach-skarbu-panstwa-i-instytucjach-panstwowych,artykuly,381794,1.html 
(26 september 2016)
5 skarżyński, stanisław (2016): Afera misiewiczowa. Macierewicz złamał prawo. source https://oko.press/afera-
misiewiczowa-macierewicz-lamie-prawo/ (26 september 2016)
6 najwyższa izba kontroli (2005): Informacja o wynikach kontroli wykonywania obowiązków przez przedstawicieli 
Skarbu Państwa w spółkach prawa handlowego. source: file:///users/kaja/downloads/px_1999061%20(1).pdf 
(9 october 2016)
7 postuła, igor (2011): problemy polityki personalnej w radach nadzorczych spółek skarbu państwa. 
Problemy Zarządzania, vol. 9, no. 4 (34). 226–246. source: http://pz.wz.uw.edu.pl/sites/default/files/artykuly/
pz_4_2011-1_postula.pdf (9 october 2016); siemiątkowski, tomasz (2014): Spółka Skarbu Państwa to nie 
przedsiębiorstwo państwowe. in kidyba, andrzej ed.: Skarb Państwa a działalność gospodarcza. warszawa, 
wolters kluwer s.a. source: https://sip.lex.pl/#/monografia/369301832/66 (9 october 2016)
8 najwyższa izba kontroli (2009): Informacja o wynikach kontroli sprawowania nadzoru właścicielskiego w 
spółkach z większościowym udziałem skarbu państwa. source: www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,1682,vp,1900.pdf (9 
october 2016)
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taking into account that state officials are subordinated to the Minister of treasury (or 
other minister), appointment of the state employees in soes’ supervisory boards clearly 
jeopardises the boards’ independence. 
considering further the issue of supervisory board members’ independence, it should 
be explained that there are formal requirements as to the independence for members in 
supervisory boards in the treasury’s sole-shareholder companies. art. 13 of commercialisation 
and privatisation act provides that as long as the state treasury remains the sole shareholder 
of the company, members of the supervisory board of that company shall not: 
1. remain employed by the company or provide work or services for its benefit under another 
legal title; 
2. have shares in companies set up by the company, except shares admitted to public trading 
under separate provisions; 
3. remain employed by the companies referred to in subparagraph 2 or provide work or 
services for their benefit under another legal title; 
4. perform work which would be contrary to their duties or might arouse suspicions of 
partiality or mercenaries. Furthermore, as a member of a supervisory board cannot be a 
person who is employed as a member of the polish parliament or european parliament 
members’ offices; or is employed by  a political party or is a member of a representative 
body of political party. 
defects of such regulations are quite straightforward. First of all, there is no formal limit 
for a supervisory board candidate to be a member of political party. however, some authors 
argue that there is no need to introduce such limitation on candidates to supervisory boards 
as it does not prevent situations in which candidates would be supported by a political 
party.9 Thus, possibly the only way to provide factual independence of supervisory boards’ 
members is introducing  an obligatory public qualification process and precise selection 
criterion.
4. centralisation oF ownership riGhts (point d oF the oecd 
Guidelines)
up to now poland was assessed by the oecd as a one of the countries with centralized 
organization of ownership rights in soes.10 currently, the organization of ownership 
function over soes is subject to fundamental changes.
The ownership entity in the light of point d of the oecd Guidelines is the Ministry 
of treasury. The Ministry of treasury was created in 1996, and replaced the Ministry of 
ownership transformations. The Ministry of treasury consist of ten departments (i.e. 
department of ownership supervision or department of strategic companies) and offices. 
9 postuła 2011.
10 The oecd (2005): OECD Comparative Report on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises. source: 
www.thepresidency.gov.za/electronicreport/downloads/volume_4/business_case_viability/Bc1_research_
Material/oecd_comparative_analysis.pdf (9 october 2016)
105
stu
di
es
 •
pro public o b ono – publ ic  Administrat ion •  2017/  Specia l  edit ion 1
to date, the bulk of soes are under the supervision of the Ministry of the treasury. 
a relatively small number of soes is (or – taking into account the recent changes – was) 
supervised by other Ministries, in particular by the Ministry of energy and the Ministry of 
infrastructure as well as by regional authorities. 
nonetheless, the Ministry of treasury is to be liquidated in the first quarter of 2017. 
when announcing liquidation of the Ministry of treasury, the Minister of treasury dawid 
Jackiewicz stated that the Ministry of treasury is to be replaced by an agency or holding 
company. it was the Minister’s duty to provide government with a draft legislation on the 
new organisation of ownership functions over soes. 
in the first half of 2016, a number of soes was transferred from the Ministry of treasury 
to the Ministry of energy, Ministry of development, Ministry of economy, Ministry of 
Maritime economy and inland navigation. 
surprisingly, the Minister of treasury was dismissed by the prime Minister on 15 
september 2016, and the final stage of liquidation of the Ministry of treasury will be 
supervised by henryk kowalczyk – head of the government’s standing committee. in 
her official statement the prime Minister said that: “dawid Jackiewicz met his obligation. 
he presented a concept and statutory solutions. now the Government will carry on 
legislative procedure”.11 The prime Minister also pointed out that the supervision over state-
owned companies is to be the most efficient, transparent and free from any pathology (i.e. 
political impact on board nominations).12
during the press conference on 4th of october, 2016, the prime Minister and Minister 
kowalczyk announced that substantive supervision over the soes will be exercised by sector 
ministries, whereas the ownership supervision will be exercised by a specially constituted 
body within the chancellery of the prime Minister, and kept under direct control of the 
prime Minister. Furthermore, a council for state-owned companies is to be established 
within the new ownership entity. The council would be responsible for nominating and 
appointing candidates to soes’ boards.13 
in the light of oecd Guidelines, such change in ownership policy is a step backwards. 
on the conference14 concerning soes on capital market, professor Maciej Bałtowski 
considered that currently the state is destroying corporate governance in soes rather than 
mending it. The consequences of establishing  a decentralised model of ownership function 
may be different than envisaged. 
The reform of ownership function is justified by the will to combine the recent model 
of organisation together with sector expertise. however, the tendencies among the oced 
countries are the opposite, and the countries aim instead to centralise ownership function. 
referring to the decentralised model the oecd noted that: “[t]he main advantages and 
11 press release, source: www.premier.gov.pl/wydarzenia/aktualnosci/likwidacja-ministerstwa-skarbu-panstwa.
html (8 october 2016)
12  Ibid.
13 press release, source: www.premier.gov.pl/wydarzenia/aktualnosci/nowy-nowoczesny-sposob-zarzadzania-
spolkami-premier-beata-szydlo-o-nadzorze.html (8 october, 2016)
14  conference “state-owned companies on capital market”, warsaw, 6 october, 2016.
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implement a more active industrial policy. with the shift from industry specific policies 
to more framework-oriented and market liberalisation policies, the advantages of such an 
organisation have now vanished (emph. added). The management of state-owned assets is 
shifting towards an ownership view with a focus on added value, and soe are less perceived 
as instruments of industrial policy than they used to be”.15 
Furthermore, it should be highlighted that the decentralised organisation model was used 
in poland prior to the transposition to market economy, and the restoration of a decentralised 
model carries a risk of negative connotations. 
unfortunately, at the moment of final completion of this paper (in mid-october 2016) no 
further official information or drafts have been presented to the public. Thus, it is impossible 
to address in detail other issues, such as  the creation of an ownership entity within the 
chancellery of the prime Minister or council for state-owned companies. nevertheless, it 
appears that the political impact on soes may be even stronger after the reform. 
5. accountaBility oF the ownership entity (point e oF the 
oecd Guidelines)
due to current centralisation of ownership rights in the Ministry of treasury, the relationships 
with relevant public bodies are yet clearly defined and the Minister of treasury is accountable 
for the way it carries out state ownership rights before the parliament. The parliament may 
demand the Minister resign from office or to be dismissed by prime Minister. Furthermore, 
members of the parliament have a right to ask the Ministry of treasury questions regarding 
exercising of state ownership rights. 
annually, the Minister of treasury provides the Government and the parliament with 
a report on the economic and financial conditions of state assets as well as with a report 
on economic and financial conditions of soes. The reports are published in the public 
information Bulletin of the Ministry of treasury and are available to anyone. 
it should be explained that the polish supreme audit office is a constitutional body which 
supervises government administration as well as other entities listed in the constitution and 
other acts (including soe). The supreme audit office is also empowered to provide entities 
with post-inspection instructions and recommendations. 
The supreme audit office inspected soe a number of times (e.g. in 2005, 2009 and 2013), 
by its own motion as well as on request of other state bodies or members of parliament, in 
terms of exercise of ownership supervision over soe. however, the recommendations of the 
supreme audit office are not always implemented or observed.
The autonomy of the Ministry of treasury in terms of fulfilling its responsibilities is wide. 
The Ministry also enjoys some degree of budgetary autonomy that safeguards its flexibility. 
taking into account liquidation of the Ministry of treasury in 2017, it is not yet clear how 
these issues will be regulated in terms of holding company or state agency. 
15 The oecd 2005.
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6. poland as a well inForMed and active owner (point F oF 
the oecd Guidelines)
previously, poland did not act as a well informed and active owner of the soe. This was 
subject to criticism and noticed by the supreme audit office’s reports. in reports of 2005 
and 2009, the office negatively assessed activity of the Ministry of treasury. however, in the 
2013 report the assessment was positive.
6.1. Representation at the general shareholders’ meetings (point F(1) of the OECD 
Guidelines)
The state is represented at the general shareholders’ meetings by the department of 
ownership supervision of the Ministry of treasury. The organizational structure of the 
Ministry of treasury and competences of particular departments are governed by ordinance 
no. 4 of the Minister of treasury on establishment of organization rules and regulations 
of the Ministry of treasury. it should be noted that organization rules and regulations are 
frequently amended and reflect political changes. Furthermore, detailed procedures of state 
representation and conduct of ownership supervision is subject to internal regulations of the 
Ministry which are not publicly available. 
certain departments of the Ministry of treasury act as communication channels between the 
soes and the Ministry of treasury. The soes provide adequate departments with periodical 
reports, information, draft resolutions which are further analysed and processed by state 
officials. some authors point to the stabilizing role of state officials in exercising ownership 
rights as their work positions and duties are not dependent on any political factors.16 
6.2. Board nomination process (point F(2) of the OECD Guidelines)
as it was considered in point 3 of the report, nominations to the soes’ boards are severely 
politically impacted, and this has not been overcome for more than 25 years. despite the 
establishment of a structured qualification process, there is still a possibility for a candidate 
to avoid its completion and become a member of the soes’ body. Many of the criteria for 
candidates are based on flexible and unclear factors, which finally make it possible to appoint 
any desired person.
in the soe’s which are of key importance for the treasury, candidates are selected by 
an external recruiter. however, the decisive factor standing behind the appointment is still 
political.17 
in 2010, the government proposed the establishment of a nomination committee which 
would be competent to select and nominate candidates to supervisory boards of the most 
16 postuła 2013.
17  Ibid.
108
stu
di
es
 • important soes in the treasury’s portfolio. unfortunately, the nomination committee was 
never established and the idea itself vanished from the public discussion. 
it should be underlined that the existing legal framework requires candidates to soes’ 
boards to have both a certain level of degree and experience. The Ministry of treasury also 
provides Good practices on the selection of boards’ candidates to soes’ of key importance 
for the treasury. These regulations are not always observed in practice though. 
in the line with oecd Guidelines, the Ministry of treasury runs a database of candidates, 
who passed the exam for supervisory board members in the soe. data of persons who are 
exempted from completing the exam are added to the database on request. The database is 
not publicly accessible. 
as regards the oecd recommendation on Gender equality in education, employment 
and entrepreneurship, in June 2015, the Ministry of treasury established Good practices in 
terms of ensuring a balanced participation of women and men in the governing bodies of 
companies with state treasury shareholding. according to statistics of the Ministry of state 
treasury, 29,5% of the members of the supervisory boards – representatives of the state 
treasury in companies with the state treasury shareholding listed on the warsaw stock exc-
hange – are women.18 Thus, women are under-represented in supervisory and managerial 
positions in companies with state treasury shareholding. 
The practices aimed at achieving at least 35% average participation of women among 
all the members of the supervisory boards selected and appointed by the Minister of state 
treasury by the year 2020.
6.3. Reporting duties (point F(3) and (4) of the OECD Guidelines)
Besides annual reports required under the companies act, soes are subject to additional 
reporting duties. 
The soes provide the Ministry of treasury with detailed reports on: management 
board activity, report on the soe’s activity in the previous financial year and report on the 
examination of financial reports. 
Besides the mentioned reports, the soe provides two quarterly reports. one, giving 
information on financial situation, financial credibility, the remuneration of employees and 
potential risks, is to be accepted by the supervisory board and submitted to the Ministry of 
treasury. The second report on sureties and guarantees granted is to be submitted to the 
Ministry of Finance. 
in order to provide timely and proper exercise of soes’ reporting duties, the Ministry of 
treasury annually provides soes with Guidelines on financial reporting. 
18 Ministerstwo skarbu państwa (2015): Good practices in terms of ensuring a balanced participation of women 
and men in the governing bodies of companies with State Treasury shareholding. source: www.msp.gov.
pl/en/corporate-supervision-1/good-practices/7213,Good-practices-in-terms-of-ensuring-a-balanced-
participation-of-women-and-men-in.html (9 october 2016)
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6.4. Transparency and disclosure (point F(5) of the OECD Guidelines)
There is no disclosure policy applicable exclusively to the soes. however, the soes are 
subject to generally applicable legal norms which provide for information disclosure, e.g. in 
case of public companies (i.e. companies listed on stock of exchange). 
6.5. External auditing (point F(6) of the OECD Guidelines)
in poland the soes in the form of joint-stock companies are required to be audited by a 
certified and independent external auditor.19 it should be noted that such a requirement 
is not designed especially for the needs of soes, but generally applicable to all joint-stock 
companies. it is each supervisory board’s responsibility to select an external auditor, and 
selection should be based on auditors’ experience, independence and price. The external 
auditor’s selection procedure is provided by ordinance no 34 of the Minister of treasury of 
29 september, 2008. 
Furthermore, the soes may be controlled by the supreme audit office on its own motion 
or on third-party request.20 
6.6. Remuneration policy  
6.6.1. Regulation on boards members’ remuneration between 2000–2016
prior to the year 2000 there were no strict regulations aimed at setting any rules or limits for 
remunerations of the boards’ members in state-owned companies in poland. as a result of 
serial abuses exposed during the decade of the ’90s, a new act was introduced in 2000.21 it was 
primarily meant to target social expectations, thus its practical role in establishing effective 
limitations to excessive wages has often been questioned. The act of 2000, apart from state-
owned companies also covered state agencies and other legal forms of entities owned or 
co-owned by the state and local governments, excluding state offices and administrative 
bodies. it focused on setting limits to remunerations of members of the management boards, 
supervisory boards and main accountants of the entities in question.
The act established numerous limitations in different areas referring to benefits received 
by members of the boards. it indicated a monthly wage as the base of the benefits, which 
could be supplemented in case of executives by an annual reward and additional benefits. 
The remuneration of state-owned companies was to be set by a shareholder’s (state) 
representative. its maximum amount was indirectly set by the act of 2000, and referred to 
19 art. 64 of the accounting act of 10 april, 2010 (consolidated text: Journal of laws of 2016, item 1047).
20 art. 2 of the supreme audit office act of 23 december, 1994 (consolidated text: Journal of laws of 2015, item 
1096 amended by Journal of laws of 2016, item 677).
21 The act of 3 March, 2000, on remuneration of executives in certain legal entities (consolidated text: Journal of 
laws of 2015, item 2099).
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the index of an average monthly wage in enterprises as of the last quarter of the previous 
year as announced by the central statistical office of poland.22 Thus the maximum amount 
of remuneration set out by the act of 2000, varied between the index level multiplied by 
1 (for supervisory board members) and the index level multiplied by 6 (for management 
board members).
The annual reward could have been granted by the shareholder (state) if several conditions 
were met, mainly related to economic effects of the company during the previous year. 
its maximum amount was set to the tripled monthly remuneration of the management 
board member who was to be granted the reward.
additional benefits which could have been granted to management board members 
comprised of items such as insurance policy, bonuses to cover costs of living and 
commuting, etc.23 Their total annual amount could not exceed a maximum annual amount 
of base remuneration for management board members. any terms of contracts between 
state-owned companies and their boards’ members that determined their benefits in the 
amounts exaggerating the maximums set out by the act of 2000, were null and void.
summing up, according to the act of 2000, management board members had an 
opportunity for average monthly earnings equalled to approx. 7500 € gross (approx. 6000 
€ net pay),24 excluding indirect benefits (additional insurance etc.). compared to private 
companies and taking into account satisfactory economic results achieved by the company, 
this was rather a modest level of income, which could not be able to attract top managers 
and caused demands for seeking additional profits. That has led to an introduction of 
several practical cheats which were used to increase a total income of executives in state-
owned companies. The practices including i.e. receiving additional remunerations for being 
boards’ members in holding companies, preparing paid reports for the company or “golden 
parachute” contracts, revealed serious flaws in the act of 2000, thus making it ineffective 
towards business reality.
 
6.6.2. The new regulation of 2016, on boards members’ remuneration
as the act of 2000, had been widely criticised, not only because of its flaws and ineffectiveness 
in fighting excessive wages of executives, but also for setting improper and anti-incentive pay, 
the new government established in fall 2015, was determined to pass an updated regulation 
22 The index for Q4 2015, which is the base for setting remunerations in 2016, equalled to 4280,39 pln, which 
can be roughly converted as 1000 € gross (approx. 810 € net pay). it is worth mentioning that between 2010 and 
2015, the index – for the purpose of setting the remuneration limit in state-owned companies – was artificially 
equalled to Q4 2009 and amounted to 3454,58 pln (approx. 800 € gross, 650 € net pay). Thus for 5 years 
remunerations of boards’ members in state-owned companies were not linked with the economic growth in 
poland and placed behind current trends in private enterprises.
23 tomaszewska, Monika (2013): prawo do świadczeń dodatkowych na tle przepisów ustawy o wynagradzaniu 
osób kierujących niektórymi osobami prawnymi (ustawy kominowej). Gdańsko-Łódzkie Roczniki Prawa Pracy 
i Prawa Socjalnego, 2013/3. page 129 and further.
24 calculated as a maximum allowed monthly wage (6000 €) supplemented by a maximum allowed annual 
reward represented as a monthly average (18 000 € / 12 = 1500 €).
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which was supposed to introduce a totally renewed approach. consequently, on 9 June 2016, 
the act on rules of setting remunerations of executives in certain companies25 was adopted. 
it was not supposed to replace nor repeal the act of 2000, however the new act sets out the 
rules for boards members’ remuneration in all state-owned and local government-owned 
companies, including those with state participation at a level lower than 50%, leaving the 
hitherto rules determined by the act of 2000, in other state-owned entities.
The act of 2016, provides different determinants of executives’ remunerations in com-
panies. Their remuneration shall consist of two parts. The first one is fixed and depends on 
the operational level of the company, including its assets, incomes and employment rates. 
The fixed part depends on the index of an average monthly wage in enterprises as of the last 
quarter of the previous year announced by the central statistical office of poland, which is 
multiplied by 1 to 3 in small companies26 and by 7 to 15 in the biggest companies27 (there 
are 5 levels defining the company size). The exact rate of remuneration for executives is to 
be set by supervisory board. The board may also exempt from the rules set above under 
“special conditions” (certain examples have been provided by the article 4 sec. 4 of the act), 
however if the remuneration granted shall be higher than the limits set out by the act, the 
state shareholder has to announce publicly the reasons for such ruling. in publicly traded 
companies (co-owned by the state) the remuneration can be set accordingly to the current 
levels in other publicly traded companies of a comparable size and branch of business.
The second part of remuneration (annual reward) is variable and depends on successful 
completion of business goals of the company in the previous fiscal year. its amount may not 
be higher than 50% (not higher than 100% in publicly traded companies and in the biggest 
companies) of the annual fixed remuneration. The business goals are set out in resolutions 
of the supervisory board and may include i.e. increase of net gain or net income, change of 
production rate, reduction of costs, change of certain economic indexes, etc. The business 
goals for holdings are evaluated for the entire family of companies.
Management board members cannot be paid for acting as members of the boards of 
subsidiaries. They may however be granted additional profits, along with the remuneration 
(fixed and variable). if the supervisory board’s resolution provides that, the executives may 
use the company’s assets essential for their work, such as i.e. apartment, car, computers, 
mobile phones etc. secondly, a terminal wage can be provided to an executive – replacing 
exaggerated “golden parachutes” –, which shall not be higher than his/her total fixed 
remuneration for 3 months, provided that he/she has acted as management board member 
for at least 12 months in the company. Thirdly, compensation rate for prohibition of 
competition has been severely limited and cannot exceed a 6-month fixed remuneration.
25 Journal of laws of 2016, item 1202. The new act entered into force on 9 september 2016.
26 having up to 10 employees or annual net turnover lower than 2 millions € or assets owned were lower than 2 
millions € (at least two conditions met).
27 having over 1251 employees or annual net turnover over 250 millions € or assets owned over 215 millions € (at 
least two conditions met).
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remuneration of supervisory board members is limited to the amount of  an index of an 
average monthly wage in enterprises as of the last quarter of the previous year announced by 
the central statistical office of poland, which is multiplied by 0.5 in small companies and by 
2.75 in the biggest companies.
in state-owned and local government-owned companies with their participation of at least 
50% of shares, the resolutions setting remuneration levels and their grounds are published 
by the dominant shareholder and available on the internet. 
 
7. conclusion
as the report shows, the ownership supervision in poland still needs development 
and improvement. unfortunately, the soes are regarded as part of  a political scenery, 
connecting the tempting worlds of politics and business. although a lot of time has passed 
during the last 25 years and many abuses have been revealed, hardly any efforts have been 
taken to improve transparency, efficiency and balance in soes. it may be argued that such 
an omission, although depriving and having adverse results for the state treasury and soes, 
was comfortable for all major political parties which governed poland.
nevertheless, some current developments should be assessed positively, e.g. the new 
remuneration policy. if we compare the new remuneration rules with the old ones and then 
compare them with chapter ii, letter F.7 of the oecd Guidelines on corporate Governance 
of state-owned enterprises (2015 edition, p. 19), we can see general progress in fulfilling 
the goals set out by the Guidelines, especially in setting remunerations at levels than could 
attract and motivate qualified professionals. however if we combine it with a general 
unsatisfactory level of adopting chapter ii, letter F.2 rule of the oecd Guidelines (clear 
nomination policy), it may be questionable if this goal – of attracting well-skilled managers 
– can be effectively achieved, even though the remuneration levels shall not be seen as a 
problem. also a link between the economic effectiveness of a company and remuneration 
levels has been introduced which seems to comply with fostering long- and medium-term 
interests of the enterprise in the oecd Guidelines. however still a clear remuneration 
policy is missing, allowing the levels to be adjusted in certain range in individual cases. 
The new rules of 2016, can be described as more complex, apparently rather transparent 
and allowing to set comparable remunerations’ levels with other publicly traded companies. 
however, the rules are not strict, allowing adjusting remuneration levels “manually” in 
certain cases, which may provide for justified results on one hand and help attract successful 
managers by setting their wages on a comparable level to private companies. on the other 
hand, it may lead to arbitrary decisions on remuneration, which would be based only to 
a minor extent on rules which are clear and common to everyone. The Ministry of state 
treasury in poland foresees savings of about 60 Millions pln each year due to the new 
regulations on remuneration levels in state-owned companies.28
28 press release, source: http://biznes.onet.pl/praca/ustawa-kominowa-wynagrodzenia-w-spolkach-sp-9-
wrzesnia-2016/
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in the authors’ view the main and still unsolved problem is the political impact on soes’ 
supervisory and management boards. The practice of replacing soes’ board members after 
parliamentary elections seems to be a bonus for the winning party. unfortunately, such 
practice is perceived as normal by a part of society, and soes are treated as the property 
of the governing party. Thus, it appears to be of highest importance to provide obligatory 
public qualification process and establish an independent nomination council or committee 
to select board’s candidates to soes in the treasury’s portfolio. The future will show 
whether a council for state-owned companies by the chancellery of the prime Minister will 
be independent enough to safeguard compliance with the oecd Guidelines, chapter ii, 
points B and c. however, the arrangement of the council within an ownership entity, which 
forms part of the chancellery of the prime Minister raises considerable scepticism as to its 
independence and autonomy.
Furthermore, the reform of ownership function is contrary to recommendation covered 
by point d, chapter ii of the oecd Guidelines. 
The general situation of corporate governance in soes is harmful for soes itself. 
over the last year,29 value of soes noted on the warsaw stock exchange decreased 39 million 
pln,30 and significant political impact on soes’ management (even in the minority-owned 
companies) renders them unattractive for private investors. due to government’s ownership 
policy professor r. czerniawski proposed to classify soes on the warsaw stock of exchange 
as high-risk companies.31
taking into account, that soes still play an important role on polish capital market, their 
shaky position could have undesirable effects on the economy. Thus, regardless of recent 
reform, there is a need for a diametrical change in policy on corporate governance of soes.
29 The author compared the value of listed soes just before parliamentary elections in 2015, and after one year
30 Biedrzycki, paweł (2016), Wartość spółek Skarbu Państwa na giełdzie spadła o 39 mld zł od zwycięstwa PiS 
w wyborach. source: https://strefainwestorow.pl/artykuly/20160926/wartosc-spolek-skarbu-panstwa-na-
gieldzie-spadla-o-39-mld-zl-od-zwyciestwa-pis-w (9 october 2016)
31 conference “state-owned companies on capital market”, warsaw, 6 october 2016.
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